51 ideas
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
22854 | Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes] |
22850 | Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes] |
22852 | The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes] |
22855 | One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes] |
22856 | Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes] |
22857 | The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes] |
22859 | Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes] |
22863 | Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes] |
22860 | The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes] |
22861 | Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes] |
21133 | Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes] |
22851 | In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes] |
22862 | Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes] |
22853 | Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes] |
5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |